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1Abstract—The paper focuses on security in industrial 
control systems. Numerous protocols and their incompatibility 
are undermining the security design. Also, the IEC 61850 
standard focuses on these issues. In detail, it deals with the 
compatibility between protocols and, partly, security. In the 
context of this work, a testbed together with the traffic 
generator for IEC 61850 standard and its three main parts – 
MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification), GOOSE 
(Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events), and Sampled 
Values - are designed. Additionally, the used generator is 
compared with an example of RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) 
used in standard ICS (Industrial Control Systems) networks. 
The last part of this work consists of the performance testing of 
the implemented protocols (MMS, GOOSE, and Sampled 
Values). 
 
 Index Terms—Supervisory control and data acquisition 
systems; Industrial control systems; Attack; Generator; IEC 
61850; Security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The management of nowadays industrial operations is 
taken over by operational technologies (OT). The term 
refers to computing systems, including production line 
management, mining operations control, oil and gas 
monitoring, and many others. The major segment within 
operational technology is comprised of industrial control 
systems (ICS, often also referred as Industrial Automated 
Systems - IAS or Industrial Automation and Control System 
- IACS), which include systems for monitoring and 
controlling industrial processes, such as oil refinery, power 
consumption on electricity grids, alarms from building 
information systems or generally mission-critical 
applications with a high availability requirement. ICS are 
divided into two main parts: (i) programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs) and (ii) discrete control systems (DCS), 
which also use PLC or some other batch process control 
device. Moreover, the ICS systems are mostly handled by 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems 
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(SCADA), which provide a graphical user interface for 
operators to observe the system easily, receive possible 
alarms indicating out-of-band operation or to enter system 
adjustments to manage the process under control [1], [2]. 
However, increasingly complex OT and higher 
interconnections in ICS cause many new opportunities and 
challenges on different kinds of levels nowadays. The ICS 
systems are often used in critical industry to control 
facilities, i.e., hydro-power plants, nuclear power plants, 
distribution and water treatment facilities, and other 
facilities with a significant impact on society. These highly 
interconnected systems are called critical infrastructure (CI) 
[3] because they have a significant impact on national 
assets, the basic living needs, and facilities of the population 
or the public health. An outage of such systems would have 
a significant impact on the security of the public and 
national assets. Therefore, one of the essential parts of CI is 
cybersecurity. Many attacks on ICS systems are based on 
the already-known attacks from IT networks, such as denial 
of services, malware, viruses, and others. The threat of 
attacks on ICS systems can be seen from Kaspersky Lab’s 
report of 2017 [4]. The report identified 322 vulnerabilities 
in different ICS components for the year 2017. According to 
a methodology based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System v3.0, 60 of these vulnerabilities are rated as critical 
risk, 134 are rated as high risk, 127 are rated as medium 
risk, and only one is rated as low risk. The networking 
devices and SCADA devices together contain nearly 50 % 
of the identified vulnerabilities. This underlines the 
importance of concentrating on the communication part of 
the cyber-physical systems involved in OT and ICS. Beyond 
the identified vulnerabilities, the Kaspersky Lab compiled a 
list of the most affected areas of the industry, where the 
highest number of vulnerabilities was found in the CI areas - 
energy, water industry, and transportation. 
Cybersecurity might be approached in different ways. 
However, two main directions can be identified as follows: 
(i) security assessment (SA) and (ii) security monitoring 
(SM). Security assessment includes methods, such as 
modeling, penetration testing, risk analysis, and others. SA 
helps to identify the security vulnerabilities of systems or 
single devices. However, as ICS are critical systems, it is not 
possible to use the real environment for experiments and 
tests. Therefore, a secure real-like environment must be used 
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not only to develop mitigations and defense methods, but to 
test the new devices and technologies or even to train 
security experts also. The SM method enables the analysis 
of the communication flow and the discovery of a possible 
malicious behavior, attacks, and other security incidents via 
advanced algorithms. To do so, SM needs a sufficiently big 
dataset to learn communication and behavioral patterns. 
However, most of the methods are passive, the data is 
mostly confidential and there is a need for high-quality big 
data for machine learning purposes, which would make the 
creation of more accurate and precise analytical and 
detection algorithms possible [5]. 
This paper provides recent results from a research project, 
which deals with the development of a cyber-physical 
security testbed. The developed testbed provides not only a 
secure environment for the SA, but also serves as a high-
quality data (traffic) generator for SM. The paper contains 
preliminary results from the implementation of the most 
adopted International Electrotechnical Commission's (IEC) 
communication protocol 61850. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. The main contribution of this paper is 
described in Section II. Section III provides a brief overview 
of the generators/simulators for protocols from IEC 61850 
followed by a vulnerability analysis in Section IV. The 
general description of the developed testbed is held in 
Section V with a close description of the IEC 61850 
architecture described in Section VI. Finally, Section VII 
summarizes our conclusion and points out the direction for 
the future research. 
II. RELATED WORK 
There are several generators/simulators in SCADA as is 
the case with IEC 61850. However, most simulators focus 
only on certain protocols and are unfit to simulate the entire 
ICS system. The first example [6] is based on RTDS (Real 
Time Digital Simulator), which is used to test the real-world 
closed-loop devices. The authors present a simulation of the 
GOOSE (Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event) and 
Sampled Values protocols, which are tested on two real 
relays. However, the simulator serves only for testing of the 
industrial devices, while it is not possible to simulate the 
entire network infrastructure. The second work [8] deals 
with the simulation of GOOSE protocol. The simulator is 
designed to test in a real network or in a simulated 
environment, where tens to hundreds of devices can be 
simulated. The next work [9] deals with the industrial 
network infrastructure and uses IEC 61850 protocols for the 
communication among end stations. The work describes the 
implementation of the GOOSE and Sampled Values 
protocols, but, in conclusion, the authors assume the 
implementation of other protocols from this standard in the 
future work. The authors also state that the simulator can be 
connected to the real network. The last work [10] describes 
the simulator based on libiec61850 library, which simulates 
GOOSE communication. The protocol is implemented in the 
Riverbed program and simulates the entire infrastructure 
with real GOOSE communication. 
The comparison of the selected generators is shown in 
Table I. Most of the generators are focusing on software 
simulation of GOOSE protocol. However, the presented 
testbed provides an environment for real hardware full 
implemented IEC 61850 for the security research. 
Therefore, the main advantage of the presented generator is 
the full support of IEC 61850, 1 GB/s high-speed link, 
hardware parts providing the close-to-real environment, 
monitoring passive interface, and active injection/attack 
interface. There are few generators, which provide full IEC 
61850 stack [10], [11], but these are mostly software 
simulators without any interface for real traffic injections or 
attacks simulations. So, they do not fulfill the crucial 
parameters for security testing. 
The main improvement of the state of the art and original 
contribution of this paper arises from the introduction of our 
testbed environments, which bring not only one of the new 
ICS protocol – IEC 61850, but also bring this protocol 
closer with sufficient information for its implementation in 
the own environment. Moreover, we introduce several 
libraries and benchmarks, which should help to set up the 
hardware setting of the testbed. Last but not least, we also 
introduce the brief insight into the cybersecurity issue in ICS 
systems. However, the full security analysis of ICS is behind 
the scope of this paper and it should serve just as a general 
overview for threat distribution. 
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III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
Despite the danger that threatens the infected systems CI, 
many systems are still not sufficiently secured. The proof is 
also the major attacks that have been carried out on 
industrial systems. The first major recorded attack was 
Stuxnet [18], [19], which was discovered by the 
VirusBlokAda in Belarus in 2010. This worm was designed 
to reprogram the PCL and hide the changes. Another major 
attack was called the Night Dragon [20]. The attack aimed at 
controlling the entire system via advanced tools and 
techniques, such as password breaks, targeted phishing, 
abuse of web server vulnerabilities via the SQL injection 
method, and the security vulnerability in the Windows 
operating system. Major attacks on CI include Shamoon, 
which was executed in 2012 against a Saudi Arabian Oil 
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Company [21]. The attack erased data from more than 
35,000 computers in that company. The last known big 
attack was BlackEnergy [22], [23]. This attack has been 
refined three times already. At the outset, it was a backdoor 
Trojan horse that used various components downloaded to 
the target computer to infect CI. The latest variation has 
been developed into a complex system that attacks CI in 
several phases and paralyzes it overall. 
Complex attacks usually consist of a series of smaller 
attacks targeting a specific application or device. These 
smaller attacks can be divided into known attacks and 
unknown attacks, which can be further classified according 
to the attack targets (e.g., network devices, ICS devices). An 
overview of the most common attacks on ICS devices is 
provided in Table A-I (in Appendix A). The table shows a 
description of the attack and its possible detection, and the 
risk that the attack represents. This analysis was a valuable 
input for developing the testbed, which must be prepared to 
simulate the variation of a security incident to provide a 
close-to-real environment for the machine learning 
algorithms used, i.e., in monitoring and analytical systems. 
IV. TESTBED ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION 
The testbed environment is displayed in Fig. 1. It contains 
three main parts:  
(i) Red/blue teaming; 
(ii) Threat monitoring system; 
(iii) Cyber-physical testbed based on IEC 61850. 
The (i) is connected via an active interface (allowing each 
connection and device to enter the network) to achieve high 
benefits from red/blue team approaches. To achieve high 
interoperability, the NIST standardization NIST SP 800-161 
[24] is considered in the preparation of the environment for 
security testing. The (ii) is connected via a passive interface 
(mirroring the main node between the concentrator and the 
database) not to disturb the communication itself. Moreover, 
it contains several advanced methods, such as behavioral 
model analysis, threat detection algorithms, and machine 
learning parts. Currently, the professional software 
MENDEL is used, which is a powerful threat detection tool 
along with SCADA monitoring. A close description of the 
used methods, as well as of the MENDEL software, might 
be found in [25]. The (iii) contains RTUs, which are 
connecting real devices (sensors, meters, relays, and others) 
and virtualized devices. The communication stack and 
implementation are described in the next chapter. 
 
Fig. 1.  Testbed environment developed for security testing. 
V. CYBER-PHYSICAL TESTBED WITH IEC61850 
ARCHITECTURE 
The possibility to create the communication and attacks 
on any network protocols is an essential part of designing 
the methodology for detecting and filtering attacks. We 
selected to implement the widely used IEC 61850 standard. 
This standard includes several protocols to guarantee a 
certain quality of cyber security/safety in SCADA 
communication. 
A. Description of IEC 61850 
IEC 61850 defines the standardized methods for building 
communication networks and integration of devices in 
industrial systems. The primary goal is to enable simple 
device communication from different manufacturers. This 
standard collects comprised overall 10 documents. To 
ensure reliable communication between all devices in the 
system, communication protocols are defined on all layers 
of the ISO/OSI model. For example, the transmission speed 
is crucial for critical data. For this reason, critical data from 
the Application layer is routed directly to the Data Link 
Layer using the GOOSE protocol. 
The most important parts of this standard include three 
basic protocols. The first one is the Manufacturing Message 
Specification (MMS), which uses messaging systems for 
transferring real-time data and control information between 
devices. This is an application protocol that communicates 
over transport to physical layers. Another essential protocol 
is called GOOSE. These events are used for the fast 
transferring of critical data over the entire system. One 
important thing is that the response delay must not be higher 
than 4 ms. Fast data transfer is used for communication only 
on the Link Layer. The third protocol Sampled Values (SV) 
is very similar to GOOSE, but it is not used for a critical 
event. This protocol sends high-speed multi-cast messages 
that contain user-defined values. The second layer (Link 
Layer) is used for the communication of the ISO/OSI model, 
same as with GOOSE. There are several possibilities to 
implement the considered traffic generator. It is possible to 
simulate traffic in a simulation tool (software based) or 
directly implement protocols into devices (hardware based). 
For our implementation, we selected the second variant with 
library libiec618501 to obtain the environment, which is the 
closest to the real network. Our main idea was to implement 
a system that could contain simulated network elements as 
well as real devices communicating with IEC 61850. The 
library libiec61850 provides an implementation of all three 
mentioned protocols (MMS, GOOSE, and SV). We opted 
for the well-known single-board computer Raspberry Pi 3B+ 
with the operating system Raspbian as our main hardware 
platform. This platform can be extended by several 
communication modules (LTE modem, RS232, RS485, and 
others) that are used in ICS systems. Another advantage is 
that the general purpose inputs/outputs (GPIO) might be 
used for connecting various devices from ICS (relays, 
sensors, and others). 
B. Generator Structure 
The main idea behind the design was to simulate a real-
world device from ICS networks. The Remote Terminal 
Unit (RTU) was decided to be used as a template. All three 
of the above-mentioned IEC 61850 protocols (MMS, 
GOOSE, and Sampled Values) are used in RTU for the 
communication among devices or between the device and 
HMI [26]. An example of RTU is shown in Fig. 2. It is a 
basic RTU for a transformer station that contains two relays 
and six measuring elements. Furthermore, RTU 
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communicates with GPRS/LTE with a control and 
processing unit, where data from ICS protocols are 
processed. 
Based on RTU, a generator was created. Its structure is 
displayed in Fig. 1. The main parts of the generator include 
three Raspberry Pi and one standard desktop server. First 
RPi labeled as Concentrator is the equivalent of the RTU 
from Fig. 2. The Concentrator is used to collect data from 
the Outstation A and Outstation B devices that are sent via 
MMS to the HMI. Therefore, the Concentrator performs the 
function of a server in the client-server communication. RPi 
station labeled as Outstations is used as a simulated ICS 
device or as a provider for devices that do not directly 
communicate with the IEC 61850 standard (sensors, relays, 
and others.). The last part is a desktop computer (HMI), 
which is equivalent to the SCADA control and processing 
block from Fig. 1. The connection between the stations is 
connected via an Ethernet cable and a standard switch. 
 
Fig. 2.  Example of basic SCADA RTU. 
1) MMS implementation 
The MMS protocol is based on the client-server 
communication. In libiec61850, there are two libraries iec-
61850server.h and iec-61850client.h that provide client-
server communication. The MMS protocol is implemented 
between the Concentrator and the HMI as shown in Fig. 1. 
During the usual network traffic, one MMS request per 
second is generated., the Concentrator responds with a 
message that contains the GPIO data of all RTU (including 
own) to this request. The size of generated messages is 88 
bytes per request and 125 bytes per response. 
2) GOOSE implementation 
Compared to MMS, GOOSE is based on the multi-cast 
communications called publisher-subscriber. The 
communication is mediated through three libraries, namely 
goosepublisher.h, goosesubscriber.h, and goosereceiver.h. 
The publisher sends multicast messages that are received by 
the subscribers based on an identifier. The library 
goosereceiver.h is an additional library for subscribers and it 
is used to receive GOOSE messages. As shown in Fig. 1, the 
GOOSE messages are generated from all RTU stations. For 
the Outstation A and B, each message contained a total 
amount of 195 bytes. The generated GOOSE messages from 
Concentration Station were larger because they transmit data 
for both slave stations in one message. The total amount of 
one message was 422 bytes. 
3) SV implementation 
As GOOSE, Sampled Values use the publisher-subscriber 
messaging architecture. This protocol is used to send 
periodic data messages (e.g., values from an electrometer). 
In libiec61850, there are two main libraries called 
svpublisher.h and svsubscriber.h, which are used to mediate 
the communication. As shown in Fig. 1, SV messages are 
generated only from the Outstation A and Outstation B. The 
receiver of 203-byte messages was the Concentrator, who 
passed on the data to HMI via the MMS protocol. 
C. Performance Testing of the Testbed 
In the previous sections, a test testbed based on RPi was 
introduced. This section describes performance testing of all 
RPi. The CPU utilization and transmission speed (incoming 
and outgoing) were monitored during the tests. The testing 
was divided into three parts according to the protocols used 
(MMS, GOOSE, and SV). During the tests, the generated 
traffic consisted of one protocol between the stations that 
support it. Each test lasted fifteen minutes and was repeated 
five times for each protocol. The size of the generated 
messages corresponded to the values given in the section B 
(Generator structure). 
Table II shows the average values for the CPU utilization 
and transmission speed of all the tests performed. In 
addition to the CPU utilization and transmission speed, the 
average of the maximum number of packets generated per 
second is shown in the table below. 
TABLE II. AVERAGE VALUES OF ALL TESTS PERFORMED. 
Protocol Station 
CPU  Transmission speed 
[%] [Mbit/s] [packets/s] 
MMS Concentrator 80,91 159,24 87 236,26 
GOOSE 
Concentrator 14,98 96,18 19 972,29 
Outstation A 82,8 184,72 122 072,23 
Outstation B 88,98 185,72 122 112,45 
Sampled 
Values 
Concentrator 0,77 - - 
Outstation A 79,45 206,42 129 889,42 
Outstation B 85,69 208,33 130 456,02 
 
1) Performance testing of MMS protocol 
The number of packets per second was increased from 
normal traffic, when one packet per second is generated, to 
an average of 87 236,26 packets per second (request and 
response). Figure 3 displays the CPU utilization of one test, 
which was around 80 percent for one test, which. This value 
corresponds to the value in Table II and the remaining tests, 
which were very similar. The average transmission speed 
was almost 160 Mbit/s. 
 
Fig. 3.  Example of one measurement for CPU monitoring during MMS 
generation. 
2) Performance testing of GOOSE protocol 
The second testing was focused on GOOSE protocol, 
which communicates on the second layer of the OSI/IOS 
model using multicast frames. As mentioned in Section B 
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(Generator structure), messages were generated from all 
RTUs. Table II shows that the average utilization and 
transmission speed for both Outstations was very similar. 
Both Outstations reached more than 180 Mbit/s with the 
utilization of more than 80 percent. For the Concentrator, 
approximately half of the transmission speed was reached, 
but the processor utilization was only 15 percent. This fact 
was caused by overloading the network card itself, when it 
was unable to process a large number of GOOSE messages 
from the remaining stations and generate its messages. An 
example of one of the GOOSE testing is provided in Fig. 4, 
which shows the utilization of all used RTUs. The 
remaining tests had a very similar pattern. 
 
Fig. 4.  Example of one measurement for CPU monitoring during GOOSE 
generation. 
3) Performance testing of SV protocol 
The last test was focused on the Sampled Values protocol, 
which is very similar to GOOSE. During the test, messages 
from RTU 2 and RTU 3 were sent to the Concentrator 
station. When generating Sampled Values messages, the 
highest transmission speed (over 200 Mbit/s) was achieved 
with approximately the same processor utilization on the 
Outstations as with GOOSE testing. Interesting is the CPU 
utilization of messages receiver because, during the tests, 
there was almost no use of the processor as seen in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5.  Example of one measurement for CPU monitoring during Sampled 
Values generation. 
The above tests summarize the traffic limits for three 
major IEC 61850 protocols (MMS, GOOSE, and SV) 
implemented on Raspberry Pi single-board computers. 
Whiting a standard RTU unit, the data traffic is at a 
maximum of tens of Mbit per second. According to the 
results of Table II, RPI stations are more than sufficient to 
simulate the RTU station operation. The testing also proves 
that, even if the testbed is expanded with additional devices 
(Concentrator, Outstation, and Real device), the RPi unit 
will be powerful enough to transmit all the traffic. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Security in ICS networks is a frequently debated, but still 
highly underestimated topic. Many protocols and their 
incompatibility undermine the security design. Therefore, an 
extensive analysis of the most common vulnerabilities of 
ICS protocols was performed, together with giving clear 
hints for mitigation and detection. Further, one of the most 
promising ICS protocols IEC 61850 was introduced. The 
analysis of current solutions was presented, and the common 
imperfections of these solutions identified. Among these 
solutions, we bring a high-speed laboratory environment 
with hardware emulators, which fills the identified gaps by 
implementing the main parts of IEC 61850 stack and by 
giving a possibility of injecting, attacking or capturing the 
communication. Further research should be focused on the 
implementation of the security incident scenarios and on 
extending the communication stack for the synchronization 
part of IEC 61850 (SNTP). 
APPENDIX A – ICS PROTOCOL VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION 
TABLE A-I. LIST OF KNOWN AND UNKNOWN ATTACKS [4], [27]–
[31]. 
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